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All the ideas for 'Philebus', 'works' and 'A Short History of Ethics'

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
In the Reformation, morality became unconditional but irrational, individually autonomous, and secular [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
The Levellers and the Diggers mark a turning point in the history of morality [MacIntyre]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato]
If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
When Aristotle speaks of soul he means something like personality [MacIntyre]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Sophists don't distinguish a person outside one social order from someone outside all order [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The value/fact logical gulf is misleading, because social facts involve values [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato]
Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
'Happiness' is a bad translation of 'eudaimonia', which includes both behaving and faring well [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato]
Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato]
It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato]
Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato]
The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato]
If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato]
A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
'Dikaiosune' is justice, but also fairness and personal integrity [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
My duties depend on my identity, which depends on my social relations [MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
I am naturally free if I am not tied to anyone by a contract [MacIntyre]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Fans of natural rights or laws can't agree on what the actual rights or laws are [MacIntyre]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The Bible is a story about God in which humans are incidental characters [MacIntyre]